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Supply chains in key growth industries increasingly commercialize a critical piece of technology invented by
an upstream technology supplier. The focal technology is licensed to specialist design rms and designed into
products, which are fabricated by dedicated large-scale manufacturers. We examine a technology supplier's
licensing decision in such emerging multi-party networked supply chains in which a downstream design rm's
capability may not be publicly known. We nd that the supply chain and rm prots are critically aected by
whether or not a license agreement between a technology supplier and a design rm is kept condential from
a manufacturer. Instead of licensing to two downstream rms, a technology supplier may also license to an
integrated rm with both design and manufacturing capabilities, which forms a conventional vertical supply
chain. We compare a networked supply chain with a vertical supply chain, and show that the network model
can, under some conditions, outperform the integrated conguration and increase prots for all supply chain
entities. In particular, a downstream rm can be better o decentralized, with design and manufacturing
functions taken by dierent rms. Our research helps explain the emergence of such networked supply chains
and oer insights on how to structure them to improve outcomes.
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1. Introduction
Innovative technology, commercialized in the form of intellectual property (IP), is powering
a number of industries (e.g., electronics, semiconductors). In technology supply chains, a
specialist upstream supplier, referred to as a technology supplier, invests in R&D to gain
patents, copyrights, or other forms of IP. The technology IP is then licensed and embedded
in products designed by a downstream company; these products are then launched and
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distributed to the market. In some cases, a downstream rm may be an integrated device
manufacturer (IDM) that both designs and produces products, while in other cases a
downstream design rm does not own manufacturing capacity and must collaborate with
dedicated manufacturing partners to fabricate products. This latter case with trilateral
interactions is particularly common in the electronics industry, as the increasing complexity
of design, referred to as \micron madness," and the capital intensity of manufacturing lead
to specialization and the emergence of fabless design rms (e.g., Marvel and NVIDIA)
and large specialist chip manufacturing rms, or foundries (e.g., Taiwan Semiconductor
Manufacturing Company). Some companies who were IDMs originally have even split into
separate design rms and foundries. For example, AMD, a rm specializing in the design
of computer processors, spun o its chip-manufacturing business into a separate company,
GlobalFoundries (Kowaliski 2009). Also, Conexant, a rm providing products for voice
and audio processing, divested its manufacturing arm into Jazz Semiconductor (EE Times
2002). The emergence and popularity of such networked supply chains is a bit surprising,
for fragmentation usually generates economic friction and destroys value. For example,
decentralization can result in double marginalization, which reduces total prots (Spengler
1973, Lariviere and Porteus 2001), or information asymmetry (Porteus and Whang 1991,
Chu 1992) due to private information, which destroys prot. Then why do IDMs choose to
spin o manufacturing capacities to become more decentralized? Our analysis oers one
possible explanation for this trend that emerged in the electronic industry but may not be
limited to it. What implications does this new supply chain structure have for the parties
involved and the supply chain itself? This paper oers some managerial guidelines.
We refer to a supply chain with a three-party collaboration/trilateral interactions among
the technology supplier, design rm, and manufacturer as a networked supply chain (NSC),
whose structure is illustrated in Figure 1(a). In an NSC, an upstream technology sup-
plier separately licenses its technology to design and manufacturing rms. The design rm
purchases a design license from the technology supplier, designs its product based on the
licensed IP, and relies on a manufacturer for production under a contractual agreement.
In order to manufacture a product based on a technology supplier's IP, the manufacturer
purchases a manufacturing license from the technology supplier. The complexity of manu-
facturing and concerns about yield and ramp-up time (Yoo 2008) motivate a manufacturer
to license from the technology supplier well in advance to ensure that the long lead-time
Figure 1 Supply Chain Structures.
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production process is optimized for the focal technology. Product design cycle times are
usually shorter, so licensing to design rms happens later and closer to the product devel-
opment and subsequent launch. The technology supplier's licensing decision to design and
manufacturing rms in such a networked supply chain setting go beyond traditional quan-
tity decisions, and have some unique features.
In such NSCs, coordination and incentive alignment among the technology, design, and
manufacturing rms with trilateral interactions can be quite challenging. In addition, a
downstream design rm usually has private information on its own design capability, to
which the technology supplier is not privy. This information asymmetry issue complicates
the problem even further. The extant literature has tackled licensing problems in integrated
supply chains, whose structure is illustrated in Figure 1(b). However, to the best of our
knowledge, the decision structure and performance of NSCs have not been explored in the
existing literature. In this paper, we analyze the NSC model, and compare its performance
with those under the traditional integrated supply chain model.
Because an NSC involves three entities, whether an agreement between two parties is
observable to a third is an additional important issue absent in traditional integrated supply
chains. Based on our eld studies, detailed IP license terms tend to be highly condential,
and seem to be tailored to customers and industries. In the NSC model, managers often
negotiate whether to keep license terms between two rms condential to a third party,
such as a manufacturer, and how to enforce such condentiality. Accordingly, we consider
two settings. In the rst, the manufacturer observes the design license; in the second,
the design license terms are kept condential and unobservable to the manufacturer. We
compare the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy and each party's prot in the
two settings with dierent information structures.
Using both interviews with Advanced RISCMachines (ARM) executives and information
from trade magazines and the business press, we next present a case of a technology supply
chain to highlight the underlying issues facing technology supply chains.
Technology Supply Chains: The Case of the Electronics Industry and ARM
One of the industries that embraced the technology licensing model over the last two
decades is the semiconductor industry. In electronics design, an IP core, also called an
IP block, is \a reusable unit of logic, cell, or chip layout design that is the intellectual
property of one party".1 A major technology supplier in the industry, Advanced RISC
Machines (ARM), a U.K.-based company sells IP cores to its licensees who create subsys-
tems, such as microcontrollers, CPUs, and systems-on-chips (SoCs), particularly suitable
for portable devices. According to Thomson (2015), almost all smartphones around the
world use ARM's technology. Every day, about 4.3 billion people, or 60 percent of the
world's population, touch a device embedded with ARM's technology (Vance 2014).
Despite the prevalence of its technology, ARM does not produce or sell a single phys-
ical product. Instead, ARM creates a network or ecosystem of companies that share the
underlying technology (Williamson and De Meyer 2012). ARM's customers include fab-
less semiconductor companies that are pure product design rms without manufacturing
capabilities such as Marvel and Qualcomm, as well as IDMs with integrated design and
manufacturing capabilities such as Texas Instruments or Samsung. These downstream
licensees usually have better information about their own capabilities and the end market
(Williamson and De Meyer 2012). This is particularly the case because the low entry bar-
riers in the design space have caused substantial entries of new design rms. Many design
rms are small with a relatively short history, whose true design capability is hard for
others to observe. In addition, ARM, focusing on developing new technologies instead of
selling in any particular product market, does not know the product market as well as its
downstream licensees. Through its \Processor Foundry Program," ARM builds a three-way
partnership among ARM itself, an approved foundry, and a fabless semiconductor rm,
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semiconductor_intellectual_property_core
which enables fabless rms to eciently use ARM's technology to design and manufacture
SoCs (ARM 2016b). In the \Processor Foundry Program Product Schedule", ARM pro-
vides a list of approved foundries with process technologies that potential fabless customers
can use for production (ARM 2016b). These foundries engage with ARM early and pay a
license fee, called a technology access fee, to access ARM's technology roadmaps and latest
releases. In other words, licensing to foundries happens earlier to accommodate the long
lead-time in ne-tuning the manufacturing process, such that when product design com-
mences, production issues are largely resolved, thereby encouraging fabless companies to
embrace the foundry's technology. As one ARM executive stated it, \What good is a wafer
(to a fabless customer) if it is not optimized for the core?" Design licenses with fabless
rms usually combine a one-o licensing fee and a royalty for every unit of product that
embodies the IP (Williamson and De Meyer 2012). Based on our interviews with ARM
managers, design licenses may be customized based on the customer/industry situation
that ARM faces. Technology-licensing discussions are currently condential two-party dis-
cussions between ARM and the foundry on one hand, and between ARM and the fabless
design rm on the other hand. Discussions with executives at ARM and other rms in the
ecosystem underscore the sensitivity and condentiality of licensing terms; executives do,
at the same time, seem to question the benets of such condentiality.
Our analysis reveals that a technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy critically
depends on the supply chain structure. In an NSC, the pooling strategy (i.e., oering one
design license that both types of design rms will take) can be the technology supplier's
optimal strategy under certain conditions, and it is also possible that the technology sup-
plier may charge a positive royalty to the high-type design rm, which can be higher than
the royalty charged to the low type. These features of the optimal licensing strategy are
in sharp contrast with those in an integrated supply chain. In addition, we also nd that
the information structure has a signicant impact on prots. A technology supplier can
achieve a larger prot by keeping the design license terms condential from the manufac-
turer. However, a design rm may have a dierent preference, and even the technology
supplier itself may change its preference at dierent stages of the game. We show that an
NSC with condentiality, when compared to the benchmark integrated supply chain, can
outperform the integrated conguration and yield gains for all supply chain entities. This is
because that the technology supplier, in an NSC, is more likely to use a separating strategy
(i.e., using dierent design licenses to target dierent types of design rms) and license the
technology to a design rm regardless of its design capability. In contrast, in an integrated
supply chain, the technology supplier is more likely to focus only on an IDM with high
capability. Our results both explain the emergence of such NSCs and oer prescriptions
for structuring them for superior outcomes. We also address when IDMs should consider
spinning o their manufacturing operations to become pure design rms.
2. Literature Review
Our paper contributes to the literature of technology licensing, supply chain management
with information asymmetry, and collaborative new product development.
Early work in technology licensing (e.g., Kamien and Tauman 1983, Kamien and Tauman
1986, Katz and Shapiro 1986, and Kamien et al. 1992) shows that in a symmetric infor-
mation setting, xed-fee licensing is better than per-unit royalty licensing if the licensor is
not a competitor in the product market. However, the prevalence of contracts with output
royalties has promoted great interest in explaining the rationale for using royalties. Many
factors can contribute to the presence of output royalties in licensing contracts, including
information asymmetry between the technology supplier and the licensee (e.g., Gallini and
Wright 1990, Poddar and Sinha 2002, Sen 2005, Savva and Taneri 2015). Either the licensor
or the licensee may have better information about the value of the innovation, production
cost, or market demand (Poddar and Sinha 2002, Crama et al. 2008, Sen 2005). All these
papers consider licensing strategies with respect to integrated licensees who have the capa-
bility to both design and produce products. In contrast, our model considers a design rm
licensee without manufacturing capability, and hence a technology supplier faces a licens-
ing problem with two downstream licensees, between whom there are price and quantity
interactions. This three-party network structure involves more complex information ows
and additional coordination issues absent in the traditional two-party integrated model.
In the new product development and innovation literature, researchers have examined
how interactions between rms in a supply chain aect investment or innovation (Gupta
and Loulou 1998, Gilbert and Cvsa 2003, Iyer et al. 2005, Bhaskaran and Krishnan 2009,
Wang and Shin 2015). Ulku and Schmidt (2011) show that the optimal supply chain struc-
ture and product architecture are inter-linked. Incorporating sellers' and buyers' demand-
enhancing eorts, Agrawal and Oraiopoulos (2015) study contract structures between a
seller and a buyer in which the contract terms also involve decision rights on who deter-
mines ex ante the menu of contracts and who decides ex post the pair of price and quantity.
Crama et al. (2015) examine R&D collaboration between an innovator and a marketer,
and investigate how control rights, options, payment terms, and timing allow an innovator
to obtain maximum value from such collaboration. Considering information asymmetry,
Xiao and Xu (2012) study strategic alliance between an innovator and a marketer with
both exerting R&D eorts and with the marketer exerting marketing eorts. Specically,
they examine two types of royalty contracts depending on whether they are contingent
on technical performance. The innovator's R&D capability is private information, and the
marketer oers contracts to the innovator. They focus on separating contracts by excluding
the pooling ones. In addition, Bhattacharya et al. (2014) compare milestone-based options
contracts and buyout options contracts between research providers and clients in attaining
the rst-best outcome for the client that performs late-stage development activities. Using
a model with information asymmetry, Savva and Taneri (2015) explain why equity-royalty
contracts are used in university technology transfer, and show that such equity-royalty
contracts are better than xed-fee-royalty contracts due to fewer value destroying distor-
tions. Except for Bhaskaran and Krishnan (2009), who study investment and innovation
sharing between two horizontal rms, most of these papers{with or without information
asymmetry{study vertical supply chains with one supplier and one buyer. In contrast, our
paper considers a setting with a technology supplier licensing IP, instead of selling physical
goods, to two downstream rms, who conduct design and manufacturing functions and
interact based on a contractual agreement. A technology supplier's optimal strategy to
orchestrate these two rms has not been studied before. In addition, a network structure's
inuence on a supply chain's prot is also an under-investigated question with important
and practical implications. In this paper, we try to ll such gaps in the literature.
Extending a bilateral monopoly partnership to competitive settings, Erat and Kavadias
(2006) and Erat et al. (2013) consider a two-tier supply chain with one technology provider
and multiple downstream competing rms. They focus on a technology provider's tech-
nology introduction and pricing strategies. With respect to upstream competition, Adel-
man et al. (2016) consider two asymmetric competitive technology providers and multiple
downstream rms. In their paper, the upstream rms decide the technological capability
to oer to each downstream rm and the accompanying unit price, and the downstream
rms choose their vendors and new quality levels. The paper demonstrates the impact of
upstream competition on technology diusion and identies the situation when an under-
investment problem can be solved. Although these papers involve more than two rms,
they still consider a vertical supply chain structure, for rms in the same tier play simi-
lar roles. In contrast, the three entities we consider in our NSC model play dierent and
complementary roles, thus forming a network structure instead of a vertical one.
In the literature studying high-tech industries, most existing research on the semiconduc-
tor industry (e.g., Erkoc and Wu 2005 and Wu et al. 2013) focuses on capacity expansion
and coordination decisions, not IP issues. In contrast, our paper studies an emerging NSC
model by focusing on IP licensing decisions. The coordination of decisions among multiple
rms turns out to be an intricate question, as we discuss below.
3. Model
An upstream technology supplier develops and licenses technologies to a design rm and
a manufacturer. The design license includes a one-time upfront licensing fee and a royalty
fee for each unit of product sold. In practice, a technology supplier such as ARM may
help design rms by providing starter kits (BBC 2015), reference designs, libraries (ARM
2016c), training courses (ARM 2016a), and even prototypes of products. In order to reect
such support from a technology supplier to design rms, we do not restrict the licensing fee
to be nonnegative. We also analyze the case where the licensing fee must be nonnegative as
an extension in Section 6.3, and show that our main insights remain the same. Consistent
with the practice of ARM, we assume that the manufacturing license involves only a xed
upfront licensing fee. Because what aects the nal selling quantity and rms' prots is
the sum of royalties in the design license and the manufacturing license, incorporating a
positive royalty fee in the manufacturing license does not change the technology supplier's
optimal licensing strategy or each party's equilibrium prot. So the assumption of zero
royalty in the manufacturing license is also without loss of generality.
The market potential of the product depends on the design rm's design competency
using the new technology, which is its private information. We model this information
asymmetry as simply and consistently with the prior literature as possible by assuming
that the design rm's capability can be either high or low. The design rm with high
(low) capability is referred to as high (low) type. The high-type design rm is able to
develop a product of high demand with an inverse demand function p=AH   q, whereas
the low-type design rm can only capture low demand with an inverse demand function
p=AL  q (AL <AH). We dene  =AL=AH , which is the ratio of market potentials. The
technology supplier does not know the design rm's capability but has a prior belief that
the capability is high with probability  and low with probability 1 , 0< < 1.
The design rm and the manufacturer interact based on a wholesale price contract.2
Without loss of generality, we normalize the manufacturer's unit production cost to zero,
because having a positive per-unit product cost is eectively the same as reducing the
demand intercepts. We also normalize the manufacturer's xed cost to zero without loss of
generality, because the technology supplier can simply reduce the manufacturing licensing
fee to cover the manufacturer's xed cost. When deciding the wholesale price to charge
the design rm, the manufacturer has already observed the designed product. Based on
the product's technical details and functionality, the manufacturer can infer whether the
demand is high or low. However, at that time, the manufacturer may or may not be privy to
the design license agreement between the technology supplier and the design rm. That is,
the design license is a dierent piece of information from the design rm's type. In the NSC
model, whether the manufacturer can observe the design license is an important element
that aects the optimal wholesale price decision and the equilibrium results. Therefore,
we study and compare two NSC models, one with the design license observable to the
manufacturer in Section 4.1 and the other with the design license condential in Section
4.2. The timeline for both settings is as follows:
(1) The technology supplier licenses to the manufacturer by proposing a one-time upfront
licensing fee FM to the manufacturer, who accepts this license as long as its expected
prot is nonnegative. Alternatively, the technology supplier can specify that the man-
ufacturing licensing fee will be refunded if no sales materialize. By setting a non-
refundable licensing fee the same as the expected payment from the manufacturer
2 In practice, due to the limited number of manufacturers with cutting-edge manufacturing technologies and expensive
capital investment, a manufacturer's bargaining power is usually high when compared to that of a design rm. Thus,
we consider the case with the wholesale price oered by the manufacturer. Nevertheless, we conducted the analysis
when the wholesale price is determined via non-cooperative bargaining between the design rm and the manufacturer,
and nd that the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy and all the rms' prots are continuous in the
manufacturer's bargaining power. As long as the manufacturer's bargaining power is high enough, all our qualitative
results still hold.
in the refundable case, the two alternatives are mathematically equivalent. Thus, we
assume that licensing fee is non-refundable in the analysis for exposition simplicity.3
(2) The technology supplier licenses IP to the design rm with private type information.
Denote ri and Fi, i2 fL;Hg as the per unit royalty and one-time licensing fee for type
i design rm. The technology supplier can either oer one license (rH ; FH) to attract
the high-type design rm only (high-type-only strategy), or propose a menu of two
licenses{(rL;FL) targeting the low type and (rH ; FH) targeting the high type{to attract
both types (inclusive strategy).
(3) The design rm, per its type, decides whether to accept the license and, if facing
two choices, which license to take. The design rm then designs the product, and the
market potential is realized.
(4) Observing the design rm's end product and type, the manufacturer decides the whole-
sale price wi, i2 fL;Hg. The design license terms between the technology supplier and
the design rm are observable to the manufacturer in the observable NSC model, and
unobservable in the condential NSC model.
(5) The design rm determines the order quantity q from the manufacturer and sells end
products at the market-clearing price p=Ai  q, i2L;H.
The notation is summarized in Table 1. We now derive the equilibrium outcomes.
4. Analysis
Our analysis of the NSC depends on whether the design license is observable to the man-
ufacturer.
4.1. NSC Model with Observable Design License
In this subsection, we derive the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy and rms'
equilibrium prots in an NSC when the design license is observable to the manufacturer.
We start by considering the design rm's and manufacturer's respective problems.
3 In practice, refundable payments can avoid the situation in which the manufacturer has paid the licensing fee
upfront, but ex post there is no business from the technology supplier (e.g., the technology supplier's strategy is
to attract the high-type design rm only, but the design rm turns out to be low type). However, for the sake of
simplicity, we use non-refundable manufacturing licensing fee due to its mathematical equivalence to the refundable
payments.
Table 1 Summary of the notation
Symbol Description
 Technology supplier's prior probability that the design rm has high capability.
A Intercept in the inverse demand function.
 The ratio of market potentials, i.e., AL=AH .
q Selling quantity of end products.
w Wholesale price.
x Eective demand, i.e., A w.
r Royalty charged to the design rm (or IDM).
Fi Licensing fee charged to type i design rm (or IDM).
FM Licensing fee in the manufacturing license.
 Prot.
T The technology supplier's prot excluding FM , i.e., T  FM .
Subscript
T Technology supplier.
i2 fL;Hg Type-i design rm (or IDM).
M Manufacturing rm.
SC Whole supply chain.
First superscript
O NSC model with observable design license.
C NSC model with condential design license.
I Integrated supply chain model.
Second superscript
I Inclusive licensing strategy.
S (Interior) separating licensing strategy.
B Boundary high-royalty separating licensing strategy.
P Pooling licensing strategy.
H High-type-only licensing strategy.
The subscript, rst superscript, and second superscript (if used) denote the player, supply chain model, and technology
supplier's licensing strategy, respectively. For example, OPT represents the technology supplier's prot when using the pooling
licensing strategy in an NSC with observable design license.
4.1.1. Design and Manufacturing Firms' Decisions If a type i (i=H;L) design rm
takes a license (r;F ) (r Ai) from the technology supplier and a wholesale price w (w 
Ai  r) from the manufacturer, then its prot maximization problem is
max
q
(Ai  q w  r) q F; (1)
where q denotes the design rm's selling quantity. Solving this problem gives the design
rm's optimal quantity (Ai  r w)=2. Note that if w > Ai   r, then the design rm
will choose not to sell the product. When setting the wholesale price, the manufacturer
knows the design rm's type. Anticipating the design rm's optimal quantity decision, the
manufacturer's prot maximization problem over wi is maxwiAi r(Ai  r wi)wi=2 FM .
Solving this problem, we obtain the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price wi(r) = (Ai 
r)=2. To ensure wi(r)Ai  r, rAi must hold. Otherwise, the design rm will not set a
positive selling quantity. Substituting wi(r) = (Ai r)=2 back into the design rm's optimal
quantity, we derive selling quantity qOi as a function of the royalty r as q
O
i (r) = (Ai  r)=4,
and the corresponding optimal prot for the design rm and the manufacturer are:
Oi (r;F ) =
(Ai  r)2
16
 F; (2)
OM(r;FM ;Ai) =
(Ai  r)2
8
 FM : (3)
If r > Ai, the design rm cannot protably sell the product. Therefore, the type i design
rm will accept a license (r;F ) only if rAi and Oi (r;F ) 0.
4.1.2. Technology Supplier's Problem When designing the manufacturing license, nei-
ther the technology supplier nor the manufacturer has information about the demand.
Thus, the manufacturer chooses to participate as long as its expected prot is nonnegative,
and it is optimal for the technology supplier to set the one-time licensing fee FM to extract
all the expected prot from the manufacturer.
When proposing the design license, the technology supplier needs to choose between
the high-type-only strategy and the inclusive strategy. We rst derive its optimal license
terms and prot under the inclusive strategy, and then compare this prot with that in
the high-type-only strategy to pin down its nal optimal licensing strategy.
Inclusive strategy
By the revelation principle (Myerson 1979), it is sucient to consider the truth-telling
mechanism. The technology supplier oers two design licenses: (rH ; FH) targeting the high-
type design rm and (rL;FL) targeting the low type. Either type must collect a nonnegative
prot by taking the license that is intended for it. The individual rationality constraint
for type i (IRi) is: Oi (ri;Fi) 0 and ri Ai, i2 fL;Hg. In addition, the design rm must
prefer to truthfully reveal its own type and take the license that targets it rather than
pretend to be the other type. If a type i design rm reports to be type j; j 6= i and rj <Ai,
its prot is Oi (rj;Lj). If rj Ai, then the type i design rm obtains zero prot by reporting
to be type j and thus has no incentive to do so. Therefore, the incentive compatibility
constraint for type i (ICi) is: Oi (ri;Fi) Oi (rj;Lj) or rj Ai, i 2 fL;Hg and i 6= j. Note
that by the IRL constraint, rL AL must hold. Therefore, rL AH cannot hold by AH >
AL, and the ICH constraint must require 
O
H(rH ;FH)  OH(rL;FL). To summarize, the
technology supplier's problem is to maximize its expected prot subject to IRCs and ICCs,
i.e.,
max
f(rH ;FH);(rL;FL)g
rHq
O
H(rH)+ (1 ) rLqOL (rL)+FH +(1 )FL (4a)
Figure 2 Technology Supplier's Inclusive Strategy in the NSC Model with Observable Design License
s.t. IRH: OH(rH ;FH) 0 and rH AH ; (4b)
IRL: OL (rL;FL) 0 and rL AL; (4c)
ICH: OH(rH ;FH) OH(rL;FL); (4d)
ICL: OL (rL;FL) OL (rH ;FH) or rH AL: (4e)
In the inclusive strategy, the technology supplier should set the licensing fee FL to extract
all prots from the low type, and FH so that the high type is indierent between taking
its own license and accepting the low-type license. The technology supplier's mechanism
design problem is simplied as follows:
Lemma 1. In the NSC model with observable design license, the technology supplier's
optimal royalties when using the inclusive licensing strategy can be obtained by solving:
max
frHAH ;rLALg
OI(rH ; rL) (5a)
s.t. rH  rL or rH AL; (5b)
where
OI(rH ; rL) =q
O
H(rH)rH +(1 ) qOL (rL)rL+
(AH   rH)2
16
+
(AL  rL)2
16
  (AH   rL)
2
16
:
(6)
The technology supplier's inclusive strategy can be a pooling strategy or a separating
strategy. The high-type design rm has a higher demand than the low type, and thus can
take better advantage of a low royalty. Meanwhile, the high-type design rm is able to
aord a higher royalty. As a result, there are two ways that the technology supplier can
Figure 3 The Technology Supplier's Optimal Strategy in the NSC Model with Observable Design License
(a) Optimal Inclusive Strategy (b) Optimal Final Strategy
Note. 1.High type only; 2.Interior high-royalty separating; 3.Interior low-royalty separating; 4.Boundary high-royalty
separating; 5.Pooling.
prevent the low type from taking the high type's license: either charging the high type a low
royalty combined with a high licensing fee (i.e., low-royalty separating), or charging a high
royalty that the low type cannot aord (i.e., high-royalty separating). In the high-royalty
separating strategy, the high royalty can be strictly higher than AL (interior high-royalty
separating strategy) or exactly the same asAL (boundary high-royalty separating strategy).
The feasible regions and the corresponding strategies are illustrated in Figure 2.
Solving the constrained optimization problem, we derive the technology supplier's opti-
mal inclusive strategy, as illustrated in Figure 3(a).4
Technology supplier's nal optimal strategy
The technology supplier may also use the high-type-only strategy, in which case its problem
is to maximize prot from the high type subject to the high-type design rm's participation
constraint, i.e.,
max
frH ;FHg

 
qOH(rH)rH +FH

s.t. OH(rH ;FH) 0 and rH AH :
Solving for the optimal high-type-only strategy, and comparing the technology supplier's
optimal prot by using the high-type-only strategy with that obtained by using the inclu-
sive strategy, we have the following results.
4 The detailed mathematical expressions are relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 1. There exists an increasing function ^ (), such that in the NSC model
with observable design license, the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy is shown
below
  ^ () high type only
 > ^ () and  > 1=2 interior low-royalty separating
 > ^ () and   1=2 changes from interior high-royalty separating, to boundary high-
royalty separating, and nally pooling as  increases from 0 to 1:
The optimal royalties and licensing fees are:
 rOHH = AH3 , FOHH =
A2H
36
in the high-type-only strategy;
 rOSL = (1 2)AL+AH3(1 ) , FOSL = (AH (2 )AL)
2
144(1 )2 and r
OS
H =
AH
3
, FOSH =
(11 5)A2H+3(1+)A2L+6(1 3)AHAL
144(1 ) in both interior high-royalty and low-royalty separating
strategies;
 rOBH = AL, FOBH = (AH AL)(AH (2 )AL)24(1 ) and rOBL = rOSL , FOBL = FOSL in the boundary
high-royalty separating strategy;
 rOPH = rOPL = AL+2(AH AL)3 , FOPH = FOPL = ((1+)AL AH)
2
36
in the pooling strategy.
Proposition 1 is illustrated in Figure 3(b). The technology supplier's optimal licensing
strategy is contingent on two factors: the technology supplier's prior belief that the design
rm has high capability, , and the ratio of market potentials . When  is low, i.e.,
  ^ () (area 1), the high demand is much larger than the low demand, so the revenue
from the high type is more important. Thus, the technology supplier uses the high-type-
only strategy to extract as much prot as possible from the high type. The threshold ^ ()
is increasing in . As  increases, the probability of high-type design rm increases, so the
technology supplier is more likely to focus only on the high-type and use the high-type-only
strategy. When  > ^ (), both types are important revenue sources for the technology
supplier, and the inclusive strategy should be adopted.
The optimal licensing strategy in the NSC presents several unique features compared
with that in traditional purely vertical supply chains derived in the literature. First, in
the vertical supply chain with two parties, the upstream technology supplier's optimal
inclusive strategy is always separating (Sen 2005, Antelo 2012, Poddar et al. 2002). But in
our NSC model, there are more possibilities. Pooling can also be the optimal strategy, and
this occurs when the two types are very similar (i.e., large , in area 5 of Figure 3(b)).
Second, in a vertical supply chain, the license for the high type must be a pure xed
fee license, or rH = 0. However, in the NSC model, rH is positive for all licenses. This
is because in the NSC model, the manufacturer charges a positive wholesale price and
creates ineciency; setting a zero royalty leaves room for the manufacturer to collect more
prot. As a counteractive action, the technology supplier optimally sets a positive rH . The
optimal positive rH is also due to the technology supplier's lack of commitment power. If
the technology supplier could commit to a zero royalty when it signs with the manufacturer,
then the supplier can charge higher licensing fees for both the manufacturing license and
design license. However, since the technology supplier cannot commit to a zero royalty
upfront, it cannot extract the additional prot from the manufacturer using the licensing
fee in the manufacturing license. In such a case, ex post, the technology supplier is better
o charging a positive royalty and collecting prots from both the royalty and licensing
fees. We will discuss further about the roles of commitment and information in Section
4.3.
Third, the technology supplier always sets rL > rH = 0 to separate the high and low types
in a vertical supply chain. Whereas the possibility of rH > rL under the separating strategy
in the NSC model presents a sharp contrast. If  is small (area 2), the market potential dif-
ference is high, and the two types can be easily separated due to their signicant dierence.
Then the technology supplier optimally charges a higher royalty to the high-type design
rm to achieve separation, and the optimal strategy is interior high-royalty separating. As
 increases (area 4), the market potential dierence becomes smaller. The technology sup-
plier's optimal strategy is to set rH =AL > rL (boundary high-royalty separating strategy)
in order to prevent the low type from taking the high-type license.
4.2. NSC Model with Condential Design License
In the previous subsection, we assume that the manufacturer, when it determines the whole-
sale prices, can observe the design license. However, this may not always be the case, as the
technology supplier and the design rm may choose to keep the design license condential.
If the design license is condential, after the manufacturer takes the manufacturing license,
then the technology supplier decides the design license, and the manufacturer decides the
wholesale price based on rational expectations of the other party's decision. They also take
into consideration the design rm's optimal reaction to the wholesale price and design
license. In our proceeding analysis, we focus on pure strategy equilibria.
Manufacturer's best response
If a type i design rm takes a license with a licensing fee F and a royalty r, given a wholesale
price w, then its prot maximization problem is the same as that in equation (1), and
the optimal selling quantity is (Ai  r w)=2. The manufacturer makes its wholesale price
decision based on its rational expectation of the royalty. Denote the manufacturer's belief
of the royalty in the design license as ~r. Anticipating the design rm's optimal decision,
the manufacturer's prot maximization problem is
max
wiAi ~r
wi
Ai  ~r wi
2
 FM : (7)
Solving this problem, we obtain the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price as a function
of its belief of the royalty ~r:
wCi (~r) =
Ai  ~r
2
: (8)
Technology supplier's best response
Because the manufacturer does not observe the actual design license, its wholesale price
decision depends on its belief of the royalty ~r instead of the actual royalty r in the design
license. Thus, the impact of a wholesale price on the design rm is the same as reducing
the intercept of the inverse demand function. We denote the design rm's eective demand
as xi, xi =Ai wi. Then taking the manufacturer's wholesale prices wH ;wL as given, the
technology supplier is eectively facing two types of design rms with inverse demand
functions p= xi q, i2 fL;Hg. If the type i design rm takes a license (r;F ) (r xi), then
its prot maximization problem is maxq (xi  q  r) q F . Solving this problem gives us the
optimal quantity qCi (r) = (xi  r)=2, and its corresponding design rm's prot Ci (r;F ) =
(xi  r)2 =4 F . Note that if r > xi, then the design rm cannot protably sell the product.
Therefore, the type i design rm earns a nonnegative prot by taking a license (r;F ) only
if r xi and Ci (r;F ) 0.
In any pure strategy equilibrium, depending on the relationship between xH and xL,
there are three possibilities: xH <xL, xH = xL, and xH >xL. We rst solve the technology
supplier's optimal response when xH >xL and present the results in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. Denote () =
2+(1 )
p
(1 )
1 +2 . In the NSC model with condential design
license, when xH >xL,
 if xL
xH
2 [();1), then the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy is separating,
and the royalties are rH(xL; xH) = 0 and rL(xL; xH) =
(xH xL)
1  ;
 if xL
xH
2 (0; ()), then the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy is high-type-
only, and the royalty is rH(xH) = 0.
Figure 4 The Technology Supplier's Optimal Strategy in the NSC Model with Condential Design License
We next discuss the other two cases. If xH < xL, then the low-type design rm has a
higher eective demand than the high type. In this case, the technology supplier's mech-
anism design problem is similar after we switch the eective demand parameters xL; xH ,
and replace  with 1  . In other words, the technology supplier is facing a design rm
whose demand is high (i.e., p= xL  q) with probability 1  or low (i.e., p= xH   q) with
probability . If xH = xL, then from the technology supplier's point of view, the two types
are eectively the same and it is optimal to set a zero royalty and extract all prots using
the licensing fee.
The equilibrium
Given both the technology supplier's and the manufacturer's best responses, we can now
solve for the equilibrium, which is presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the NSC model with condential design license, xH > xL always
holds. Dene () =
(2 1)+(2 )
p
(1 )
2(1 +2) . Then ()< () and we have:
 If  < (), then in equilibrium, the technology supplier uses the high-type-only strat-
egy. The equilibrium decisions are rCHH = 0, F
CH
H =A
2
H=16, and w
CH
H =AH=2.
 If   (), then in equilibrium, the technology supplier uses the separating strategy.
The equilibrium decisions are rCSH = 0, F
CS
H = ((8  7)A2H   12(1  )AHAL + 4(1 
2)A2L)=(8 4)2, rCSL = (AH AL)=(2 ), FCSL = (AH 2AL)2=(8 4)2, wCSH =AH=2,
and wCSL = (2AL AH)=(4  2).
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 4. When  is small (i.e.,   ()), the market
potential dierence is large. Therefore, the technology supplier uses a high-type-only strat-
egy to extract as much prot as possible from the high-type design rm. When  is large
(i.e.,   ()), the market potential dierence is small, and both types of design rms are
important prot sources for the technology supplier. Thus, the technology supplier uses a
separating strategy.
In addition, Proposition 2 shows that when the design license is condential, the royalty
that the technology supplier charges to the high-type design rm, rH , is always zero.
Recall that when the design license is observable to the manufacturer, rH is always greater
than zero, which creates supply chain ineciency. When the design license is observable,
the manufacturer's wholesale price depends on royalty in the design license. Therefore,
by charging a positive rH , the technology supplier can induce the manufacturer to oer
a lower wholesale price. In contrast, if the design license is condential, the technology
supplier cannot aect the manufacturer's wholesale price, and thus sets rH to zero in order
to minimize the value-destroying distortion. This dierence also highlights the benet of
condentiality of the design license, as we discuss below.
4.3. Information Disclosure Strategies in a Technology Supply Chain
We now compare the two NSC models to analyze how the information transparency of
the design license aects each party's prot, and how the technology supplier and design
rm should manage the condentiality of the design license. We rst study the technology
supplier's expected prot in an NSC.
Proposition 3. In an NSC, the technology supplier's total prot is higher if the design
license is kept condential.
As the technology supplier extracts all expected prot from the manufacturer, its total
prot equals the total supply chain prot minus the information rent paid to the high-
type design rm (if any). Therefore, the technology supplier's total prot is more closely
related to the total supply chain prot, which depends on how eciently the supply chain
is operating. The summation of wholesale price and royalty aects supply chain eciency,
and increases in the royalty in both models. The royalty for the high type when the
design license is observable to the manufacturer is positive, which is larger than the high-
type royalty, zero, when the design license is condential. Thus, when demand is high,
keeping the design license condential is more ecient. The royalty charged to the low type,
however, may be higher or lower. Overall, the technology supplier benets from keeping
the design license condential.
Even though the technology supplier obtains a higher total prot in an NSC with con-
dential design license, doing so is not easy. The technology supplier's willingness to reveal
the design license may change over time. In an NSC, after the manufacturer takes the man-
ufacturing license, the technology supplier always prefers to reveal the design license to the
manufacturer, which reduces the manufacturer's ex-post prot (i.e., its earnings from the
design rm). The design rm may or may not want to keep the design license condential.
In the observable model, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price is decreasing in the
technology supplier's royalty. In this case, the technology supplier has an incentive to raise
royalties to push the manufacturer to lower wholesale prices. In contrast, if the design
license is condential, then the technology supplier cannot inuence the manufacturer's
wholesale price through its design license terms. As a result, revealing the design license to
the manufacturer enables the technology supplier to aect the manufacturer's wholesale
prices, which benets the technology supplier but hurts the manufacturer.
Recall that Proposition 3 shows the technology supplier's total prot (i.e., its prot
including the manufacturing licensing fee FM) is larger when it keeps the design license
condential. FM is used to extract all ex-post prot from the manufacturer. If the man-
ufacturer believes that the design license will be kept condential, then its ex-post prot
is higher and, thus, it will accept a higher FM . For the technology supplier, keeping the
design license condential allows it to charge a larger FM but earn a smaller ex-post prot,
and the former dominates the latter. As a result, its total prot including FM is higher if
the design license is condential. Then how can the technology supplier convince the man-
ufacturer to pay a higher licensing fee and achieve the benet of keeping the design license
condential? The following proposition presents one mechanism to ensure condentiality.5
Proposition 4. Suppose the technology supplier has the power to impose a condential-
ity term in the design license, then if the technology supplier's contract with manufacturer
contains a clause stating that the design licenses will not be revealed (either by itself or
the design rm) to the manufacturer, with a breach penalty no smaller than OT   CT
5 In practice, condentiality can also be credibly achieved due to reputation eect in repeated interactions or because
the technology supplier licenses to multiple design rms.
paid by the technology supplier to the manufacturer, equilibrium outcomes in the NSC with
condential design license can be obtained.
In order to achieve the benet of keeping the design license condential and convince
the manufacturer to pay a higher licensing fee, the technology supplier needs to credibly
convince the manufacturer that the design licenses will not be revealed to the manufac-
turer. Because the penalty on the technology supplier for breaking such commitment is no
smaller than OT  CT , which is the maximum gain that the technology supplier can get by
deviating, the technology supplier does not benet from ex post deviating and therefore
always prefer to keep the design license condential. The technology supplier is also able
to prevent leakage from the design rm. In the next stage, when the technology supplier
licenses to design rms, it has the incentive to set a condentiality term in the design
license together with a penalty on the design rm for breaking the condentiality term.
The technology supplier, being the sole supplier of certain intellectual properties, usually
has a strong bargaining power to insist such a condentiality clause in the design license.
Finally, monitoring deviation is easy. The motivation of revealing the design license to the
manufacturer (by either the technology supplier or the design rm) is to aect the man-
ufacturer's wholesale price decision. Without convincing evidence, the manufacturer will
not believe a revealed design license, and thus will not adjust its wholesale price decision
based on any cheap talk. Therefore, the technology supplier (or the design rm) benets
from revealing only if it can credibly show the manufacturer what the actual design license
is, in which case the manufacturer will have evidence to prove that the commitment has
been broken and thus can impose the penalty.
Even though such a commitment imposes restrictions, the technology supplier still
prefers it and has the incentive to make and honor such a commitment, because it enables
the technology supplier to ensure condentiality and get a larger prot.
5. Comparing NSC Models with the Benchmark Integrated Model
5.1. The Integrated Model
In contrast to working with decentralized design and manufacturing rms, the technology
supplier may work with an integrated IDM that both designs and manufactures the prod-
uct. Similar to the NSC model, in the integrated supply chain model, the IDM has private
information about its design capability. The technology supplier has a prior belief that the
capability is high with probability  and low with probability 1  . As in NSC models,
the inverse demand curve is p=AH   q for the high type and p=AL  q for the low type,
where AH >AL > 0. Without loss of generality, the per-unit production cost and xed cost
for the IDM are normalized to zero.
In the integrated model, the technology supplier rst proposes a license (or a menu of
licenses) composed of a per-unit royalty and a one-time licensing fee to the IDM, who
then decides whether to accept the technology supplier's oer and if so, which license to
choose. If the IDM accepts a license from the technology supplier, it then decides the
selling quantity (or equivalently, the selling price) of the product. The technology supplier's
optimal licensing strategy is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. In an integrated supply chain,
 if  2 (0; ()), where () is given in Lemma 2, then the technology supplier's optimal
licensing strategy is high-type-only, and the optimal royalty is rIHH = 0;
 if  2 [();1), then the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy is separating,
and the optimal royalties are rISH = 0 and r
IS
L = (AH  AL)= (1 ).
When using the high-type-only strategy, the technology supplier uses the one-time licens-
ing fee FH to extract all the supply chain prot. Both types of IDMs receive zero prot.
Under the optimal separating strategy, the low-type IDM earns zero prot, but the high
type earns a positive prot equal to the information rent paid by the technology supplier.
In addition, as discussed after Proposition 1, it is always optimal in such a vertical sup-
ply chain to set rH = 0 to eliminate the double marginalization problem when facing a
high-type rm.
5.2. Comparisons
The NSC models dier from the integrated model in their supply chain structures. Having
a third-party manufacturer complicates the technology supplier's problem and raises new
issues when determining the optimal licensing strategy. Figure 5 summarizes the technology
supplier's optimal licensing strategy in all three supply chain models.
First, we take the technology supplier's perspective and analyze how its optimal licensing
strategy depends on the supply chain structure. We then focus on prots and study which
party benets from a more decentralized downstream industry. Because our answers depend
on whether the design license is observable in the NSC model, we oer comparisons based
on the observability of the design license.
Figure 5 The Technology Supplier's Optimal Strategy in all Three Supply Chain Models
Note. Shaded regions represent the technology supplier's optimal strategy in the NSC model with observable design
license;  is the threshold separating the high-type-only strategy and the separating strategy in the NSC model
with condential design license, and  is the parameter threshold that separates the high-type-only strategy and the
separating strategy in the integrated supply chain model.
5.2.1. NSC Model with Observable Design License versus Integrated Model The
technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy diers considerably in these two technology
supply chain models, as we discuss after Proposition 1. Figure 5 also shows that the
technology supplier is more likely to use the high-type-only strategy in the integrated
supply chain. Furthermore, with respect to the license oered to the high type, the royalty
is higher and the licensing fee is lower in the NSC model than in the integrated model.
Therefore, in the NSC model, the technology supplier relies more on the royalty and less
on the licensing fee to collect prot from the high-type downstream rm.
Which supply chain model is more desirable for the technology supplier when the design
license is observable? Does the downstream rm gain more prots in the NSC model? We
answer these questions in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. When the design license is observable to the manufacturer:
 The technology supplier's prot is lower in the NSC model than that in the integrated
model;
 The total downstream expected prot (including the manufacturer's and the design
rm's prots) in the NSC model is equal to, higher than, and lower than that in the inte-
grated model for  2 (0; ^()] ;  2 (^(); ()] ; and  2 (();1), respectively.
Proposition 6 shows that the fragmentation of the downstream industry hurts the tech-
nology supplier. In the NSC model, the relationship between the manufacturer and the
design rm is based on a wholesale price that creates ineciency. Furthermore, this inef-
ciency prevents the technology supplier from lowering royalties to improve eciency.
That said, decentralization can either improve or weaken the downstream industry's
performance, depending on market conditions. In both supply chain models, the low-type
IDM or design rm always obtains zero prot. In the NSC model, the manufacturer's
expected prot is zero because the technology supplier uses the licensing fee to extract all
its expected prot. Thus, comparing the total downstream prot is the same as comparing
the high-type rm's prot. When the technology supplier uses the inclusive strategy, the
high-type rm is able to keep some information rent. When the market potential ratio
is low (i.e.,  2 (0; ^()]), the technology supplier uses the high-type-only strategy, and
the downstream prot is zero in both supply chain models. When the market potential
ratio is high (i.e.,  2 (();1)), the technology supplier uses the inclusive strategy in both
supply chain models, and the downstream prot is lower in the NSC model than in the
integrated model. When the market potential ratio is intermediate (i.e.,  2 (^(); ()]),
the technology supplier adopts the high-type-only strategy in the integrated model, but
uses the inclusive strategy in the NSC model. In this case, the high-type downstream rm
and also the whole downstream industry obtain a positive prot in the NSC model but
zero prot in the integrated model.
The above discussion helps explain why some IDMs choose to spin o their manufac-
turing capacity to focus on design and development. A well-known advantage of the NSC
model to the downstream rms is the increased utilization of the expensive manufacturing
capacity by pooling demand from multiple design rms. Our model presents an additional
reason for the unbundling of the IDM as we focus on technology-licensing decisions instead
of capacity issues: Switching from the integrated model to the NSC model may change
the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy and thereby increase the downstream
rm's prot.
5.2.2. NSC Model with Condential Design License versus Integrated Model In
the condential NSC, the pooling strategy is never optimal for the technology supplier and
rH = 0 always holds, which is the same as that in the integrated model. However, Figure 5
illustrates that the technology supplier is more likely to use the separating strategy in the
NSC model than in the integrated model. In addition, despite the similarity with respect
to the technology supplier's strategy, the dierent supply chain structures still signicantly
aect prots, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 7. In an NSC model with condential design license:
 The technology supplier's prot is strictly higher than that in the integrated model if
and only if  < b0 and 1() <  < 2(), where b0 is a constant, 1() and 2() are
threshold functions satisfying 1() ()<2() when  < b0, as shown in Figure 6(a).
 The total downstream expected prot in the NSC model is equal to, higher than, and
lower than that in the integrated model for  2  0;  () ;  2   () ;  () ; and  2
( () ;1), respectively. The region where the downstream prot is higher in the NSC model
is shown in the shaded area in Figure 6(b).
 The total supply chain prot is higher than that in the integrated model if and only if
 2  () ;  () and   3(), as shown in Figure 6(c).
 The NSC model results in a win-win situation compared with the integrated model if
and only if  < b0 and 1()< < (), as shown in Figure 6(d).
When  is low (i.e.,  2  0;  ()), the technology supplier uses the high-type-only
strategy in both supply chain models, and thus the downstream prot is always zero.
When using the high-type-only strategy, the technology supplier charges zero royalty in
the integrated model and maximizes the total supply chain prot. In contrast, in the
NSC model, the total supply chain prot is not maximized because the manufacturer still
charges a positive wholesale price. Since the technology supplier collects the entire supply
chain prot when using the high-type-only strategy, both the technology supplier's prot
and the total supply chain prot are lower in the NSC model.
When  is intermediate (i.e.,  2   () ;  ()), the technology supplier uses the high-
type-only strategy in the integrated model, which maximizes the total supply chain prot
in the high-demand case, and leaves zero prot to the downstream rm. In the NSC model,
the technology supplier uses the separating strategy, and the high-type design rm obtains
a positive information rent. From the whole supply chain perspective, though the total
supply chain prot is not maximized for the high-demand case, the supply chain generates
positive prot for the low-demand case. If the probability of the high type is low (i.e.,
  3()), then the benet of collecting prot for the low-demand case dominates the loss
Figure 6 Regions Where the NSC Model with Condential Design License Outperforms the Integrated Model
(a) Higher Technology Supplier's Prot (b) Higher Downstream Prot
(c) Higher Total Supply Chain Prot (d) Win-win
Note: The NSC model is superior in the shaded areas. The dashed and solid lines are () and  (), respectively.
of eciency for the high-demand case; thus, the NSC model leads to a higher total supply
chain prot. In addition, if  is relatively large in this region (i.e., 1()   ()), the
dierence between the low demand and the high demand is relatively small. Then when
we compare the technology supplier's prot in the NSC model with that in the integrated
model, the prot gained from the low-type design rm outweighs the prot loss from the
high type. Therefore, the technology supplier's prot is higher in the NSC model, and
hence the NSC model yields a win-win situation for both the technology supplier and the
downstream rm.
When  is high (i.e.,  2 ( () ;1)), the technology supplier uses the separating strategy
in both supply chain models. The downstream prot is lower in the NSC model. The
technology supplier's prot is higher in the NSC model if and only if ()    2().
However, the total supply chain prot is always lower in the NSC model.
Overall, when the market potential dierence is intermediate, the NSC structure induces
the technology supplier to use the inclusive strategy instead of the high-type-only one,
which benets the downstream industry. If the downstream rm is more likely to be of low
capability, then the gain from the low type dominates, and both the technology supplier
and the whole supply chain also benet from the NSC structure.
Collectively, these results show that the NSC model with condential design license can
benet both the technology supplier and the downstream rms and lead to a win-win out-
come, especially when the market potential dierence is intermediate and the probability
of high-type design rm is low. These results also suggest another advantage of the NSC
model besides the obvious benet of pooling manufacturing capacity, and help explain the
recent rise of the NSC model in technology-intensive industries.
In an NSC, the design rm may or may not be willing to keep the design license con-
dential. If the design rm can obtain a higher prot by keeping the license condential,
then condentiality can be achieved, as long as the technology supplier can commit to its
own behavior. The following proposition describes the conditions under which the NSC
outperforms the integrated model, and the design rm is also willing to keep the license
condential.
Proposition 8. In an NSC model with condential design license:
 the technology supplier's prot is strictly higher than that in the integrated model, and
the condentiality of the design license also benets the design rm if and only if  < b0
and maxf1(); 3()g< < 2(), where 3() = (4
2+5 8)
43 32+12 8 ;
 the NSC model results in a win-win situation compared with the integrated model, and
the condentiality of the design license also benets the design rm if and only if  < b0
and maxf1(); 3()g< < ().
These results reveal that even if the technology supplier does not require the design rm
to accept the condentiality term, the design rm may still voluntarily do so; in turn, the
NSC model can lead to a higher technology supplier's prot as well as a win-win situation,
when compared with the integrated model. In such cases, as long as the technology supplier
can credibly commit to the manufacturer, the NSC outperforms an integrated model.
Figure 7 Licensing Strategy with the Design License Determined First and Observable
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6. Extensions
6.1. Design License First
When we analyze NSCs in our main model, we assume{based upon observed practice
(e.g., ARM's Foundry Program){that a manufacturer is licensed before a design rm. To
understand how our results change if the licensing sequence is altered, we characterize the
equilibrium outcome in this section with the design license determined rst. If the design
license is condential, then the equilibrium results remain the same, because the technology
supplier's design license decision and the manufacturer's wholesale price decision form a
simultaneous-move game, and the interaction is independent of the xed-fee manufacturing
license. However, if the design license is observable, then the equilibrium outcome will
change. We next focus on this latter case.
Given a design license (r;F ), the manufacturer's wholesale price decision and the design
rm's quantity decision remain the same as in the manufacturing-license-rst case. In
short, the analysis in Section 4.1.1 carries over. Anticipating these results, the technology
supplier sets F iM(r) = (Ai  ri)2 =8; i=H;L to make the manufacturer break even.
Next, we consider the technology supplier's design license problem. A key feature of
the design-license-rst case is that the manufacturer license is not sunk, and the technol-
ogy supplier's objective function accounts for the income from the manufacturing license.
For instance, the technology supplier's objective function under the inclusive strategy is

 
rHqH (rH)+FH +F
H
M (rH)

+(1 )  rLqL (rL)+FL+FLM(rL).
We compare the technology supplier's prot under the inclusive strategy with that under
the high-type-only strategy, and derive its optimal strategy (please refer to Proposition A.1
in the Appendix for detailed mathematical expressions) as illustrated in Figure 7(a). Once
again, both separating and pooling can serve as the optimal inclusive strategy. In Figure
7(b), the thick dashed curve separates the high-type-only strategy and separating strategy
in the integrated model. Figure 7(b) clearly shows a region where it is optimal to use the
high-type-only strategy in the integrated model, but optimal to use the pooling strategy
in the NSC model. Since the downstream rm earns zero prot under the high-type-only
strategy but a positive prot under the pooling strategy due to the information rent, the
downstream rm is better o with a decentralized structure in the NSC model in this
region. In addition, when the design license is determined rst, the technology supplier
obtains a higher prot by keeping the design license condential in this parameter region,
f(;) : max[+2
p
(1 )3
4 5+22 ;
(2 1)+(2 )
p
(1 )
2(1 +2) ]   (7 6)max[4 (3+2);0]g.
Finally, because the equilibrium outcome in an NSC with condential design license does
not depend on whether the manufacturer is engaged before or after the design rm, all our
results in Section 5.2.2{including the result that the NSC can benet all parties{remain
the same.
6.2. Revenue-based Royalties
In the main model, we assume that the royalty is based on the sales quantity. Once the
design license is xed, the royalty per unit is also xed and invariant with respect to the
product price. In this section, we discuss the case in which the royalty is based on the
design rm's (or IDM's) revenue, and is therefore contigent on product price. In such a
case, the royalty in the design license is specied as a percentage of the product price.
Furthermore, we can no longer normalize the per-unit production cost to zero.
If the per-unit production cost is zero, then using royalties based on sales revenue would
eliminate the distortion completely. In both the NSC and integrated models, the technology
supplier can simply charge a royalty of 100% of the end product price to extract all the
prots from the downstream design rm (or IDM). The supply chain will be coordinated,
and the technology supplier can always capture all the supply chain prots.
If there is a positive per-unit production cost, denoted as cM , then using royalties based
on sales revenue cannot eliminate the quantity distortion at the manufacturing/sales stage.
Using the integrated supply chain model as an example, if a type i (i=H;L) IDM takes a
license with a licensing fee F and a royalty rate r (r is the percentage of revenue requested
by the technology supplier) from the technology supplier, then its prot maximization
problem is maxq ((Ai  q) (1  r)  cM) q F; and the optimal quantity is (1 r)Ai cM2(1 r) . How-
ever, if the supply chain is fully integrated, then the optimal quantity is Ai cM
2
. Clearly,
the quantity decision with royalties is dierent from the supply chain optimal quantity,
and the quantity distortion remains as long as the royalty rate is non-zero. With positive
per-unit production cost, closed-form solutions of models using revenue-based royalties
cannot be achieved. To test the robustness of our main results, we have also conducted
extensive numerical studies and conrm that our main results still hold, even if the tech-
nology supplier uses revenue-based royalties. In particular, there exist parameter sets (e.g.,
AH = 3:52, AL = 1:6, cM = 0:6, and  = 0:2) such that the NSC with condential design
license leads to a higher total supply chain prot than the integrated model, the down-
stream rm's expected prot is higher in the NSC, and the technology supplier prefers to
keep the design license condential in the NSC.
6.3. Nonnegative Licensing Fee
In the analysis for the NSC model with observable design license, we nd that the licensing
fee in the high-royalty separating strategy is negative. This means that the technology
supplier subsidizes the design rm upfront, and collects the royalty payment from the
design rm later. One may wonder how the results will change if restricting licensing fee
to be nonnegative. We address this question by adding the constraints of FH ;FL  0 to
the technology supplier's mechanism design problem in (4a)-(4e).6 That is, the problem to
derive the optimal inclusive strategy under the NSC model with observable design license
and nonnegative licensing fee can be written as follows:
maxrHq
o
H (rH)+ (1 ) rLqoL (rL)+FH +(1 )FL
s.t. IRH: oH (rH ;FH) = (AH   rH)2 =16 FH  0 and rH AH
IRL: oL (rL; FL) = (AL  rL)2 =16 FL  0 and rL AL
ICH: oH (rH ;FH) oH (rL;FL) = (AH   rL)2 =16 FL
ICL: oL (rL;FL) oL (rH ;FH) = (AL  rH)2 =16 FH ; or rH AL
FH ; FL  0
6 The nonnegative licensing fee constraints only aect the NSC with observable design license, because licensing fees
are always nonnegative in the NSC with condential design license even without such constraints.
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Figure 8 The Technology Supplier's Optimal Strategy in the NSC Model with Observable Design License and
Nonnegative Licensing fee Constraint
By analyzing the constraints, we nd that if the ICL constraint is satised by rH AL;
then the rest constraints will lead to rH = rL = AL; and FL = FH = 0: In this case, the
low-type design rm's selling quantity is zero and the technology supplier gets zero prot
from the low type. Then the inclusive strategy is dominated by the high-type-only strategy.
Therefore, the ICL constraint satised by rH AL can never be optimal for the technology
supplier in the presence of constraint FH ;FL  0.
Then we only need to consider the ICL constraint to be satised by oL (rL;FL) 
oL (rH ; FH) ; which leads to rH  rL: Following similar analysis as before, we can char-
acterize the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy, as shown in Figure 8, with
the solid lines separating the three regions of optimal policy: High-type-only, interior low-
royalty separating, and pooling. The detailed proofs are relegated to the Appendix. Due
to the presence of the nonnegative licensing fee constraint, the key dierence from the case
without the constraint shown in Figure 3 is the replacement of the high-royalty separating
strategy in region 2 and 4 of Figure 3(b) by the pooling strategy (the boundary between
the high-type-only strategy and the inclusive strategy also changes slightly).
Without the nonnegative licensing fee constraint, the comparison between the NSC
model with observable design license and the integrated model is presented in Proposition
6. Our study shows that the presence of the nonnegative licensing fee constraint does not
change the qualitative comparison results. For the downstream rm, there still exists a
region where the inclusive strategy is used under the NSC model with observable design
license, which gives the downstream rm positive expected prots, but the high-type-only
strategy is used under the integrated model (the dashed line in Figure 8 is the boundary
separating the high-type-only strategy and the separating strategy). In this region, the
downstream rm is better o under the NSC model than under the integrated model.
7. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study the emerging networked technology supply chains in the presence
of information asymmetry. In particular, we examine the technology supplier's optimal
licensing strategy in such NSCs, and show that making the design license observable (or
not) to the manufacturer has a profound impact on each party's optimal decisions and prof-
its. If the design license is observable to the manufacturer, then the technology supplier's
optimal licensing strategy presents several unique features, when compared with that in
the traditional vertical supply chain. Specically, pooling can be the optimal strategy; the
royalty in the high-type license is always positive, and can be either higher or lower than
that in the low-type license in the separating strategy. In contrast, if the design license is
condential, then similar to the result in the traditional vertical supply chain, pooling is
never the optimal strategy, and the technology supplier should charge a zero royalty to
the high-type design rm. These results highlight why and how technology suppliers like
ARM should customize design licenses based on supply chain structure. To the best of
our knowledge, this paper is the rst to oer high-level guidelines on how to set licenses
to maximize prot in NSCs. Furthermore, our results also demonstrate the importance of
incorporating other value-added tasks, such as design, besides the traditional production
and inventory decisions, in studying \modern" supply chains.
In addition to these dierent licensing strategies, the condentiality of the design license
also aects prots. Specically, we nd that the technology supplier's prot is higher if
the design license is condential. However, in some cases, the design rm may have an
incentive to reveal the design license to the manufacturer. Even the technology supplier
itself, after collecting the licensing fee from the manufacturer, may be tempted to reveal its
design license to the manufacturer so as to indirectly aect the manufacturer's wholesale
price. Such challenges in achieving condentiality in an NSC{absent in a vertical supply
chain{suggest that technology suppliers such as ARM should commit up front to keeping
the design license condential, if the suppliers wish to levy the benet of condentiality;
moreover, suppliers should specify as much in written contracts with design rms to ensure
enforcement.
Crucially, we nd that the networked supply chain diers from the traditional vertical
supply chain model in rms' prots and performance. We show that if the design license
is observable in the NSC model, then the technology supplier's prot is actually lower in
the NSC model where the downstream industry is decentralized. However, the downstream
prot can be higher in the NSC model, which indicates that an IDM would gain more
prots by spinning o its manufacturing capacity and becoming a pure design rm. If
the design license is condential, then we nd that the NSC model can lead to higher
prots for both the technology supplier and the design rm, yielding an overall win-win
situation, when compared to the integrated model. These results provide one possible
rationale for an IDM, such as AMD, to spin o its manufacturing part to become a pure
design rm. Furthermore, our analysis shows that such decentralization is more benecial
for the downstream rm when the market potential dierence is intermediate.
Our research is motivated by a major new supply chain structure pioneered by ARM
in the semiconductor industry. Such NSCs require not only that technological advances
drive supply chain progress, but also that design and manufacturing knowledge are fairly
explicit and codied. As other technology industries become more and more mature in
new product development and manufacturing, we may see such NSCs emerge as well. For
example, in the biotechnology industry, technology is a crucial factor, but manufacturing
knowledge has historically been highly tacit and coupled to the design of the product.
However, the emergence of contract pharmaceutical and biotech manufacturers7, such as
Wockhardt and Wuxi, and codication of biotech manufacturing (The Medicine Maker
2016) in the last few years raises the possibility of NSCs similar to the one studied in this
paper. In summary, as technology industries (such as the biotechnology industry) mature
their design and manufacturing functions, we conjecture that they would also develop
networked supply chains. Our analysis can provide guidance on whether and how they
should form such NSCs.
7 For a list of biopharmaceutical contract manufacturers, please see http://www.hightechdecisions.com/industry_
bioman.html.
The NSC structure that is emerging in several industries (e.g., semiconductors, auto-
motives, life sciences) requires an intricate licensing approach and information disclosure
strategy, and deserves further research attention due to its superior performance. This
study on NSCs also oers several new directions for future research. First, in our NSC
model, there is one technology supplier. It may be worthwhile to study how competition can
aect the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy and rms' prots. Second, since
both the NSC model and the integrated model can co-exist and compete in practice, it will
be interesting to study competition between supply chains. Third, this research focuses on
the technology supplier's licensing strategy and the information asymmetry on the design
rm's capability. However, when introducing new electronic products, the manufacturer
may also have to exert signicant process development eort, whose outcomes are uncer-
tain. Incorporating the manufacturer's development eort, beyond the scope of this paper,
should be a topic of future work as it can generate new insights. Finally, our theoretical
results can potentially be empirically validated in the emergence and growth of networked
supply chain in more technology-driven industries. For example, our results indicate that
the downstream rm gets a higher prot in the NSC model than the integrated supply
chain model when the probability of high demand is intermediate. As a result, as a new
technology-driven industry emerges, it has a low market size at the beginning and hence
integrated supply chain model is expected. But as the market size grows to a certain level,
i.e., the probability of high demand for newly developed products increases to a certain
magnitude, networked supply chains are likely to emerge.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. First, constraint (4b) is satised if constraints (4c) and (4d) are satised, because
OH(rH ;FH)  OH(rL;FL) > OL (rL;FL)  0. And constraint (4d) should be binding, because otherwise the
supplier can increase FH to increase prot. In addition, constraint (4c) should be binding, because otherwise
the supplier can increase FL and FH simultaneously to increase prot. By solving the two binding constraints
we have: FL =
 
AL rL
4
2
, and FH =
 
AH rH
4
2   AH rL
4
2
+
 
AL rL
4
2
.
Substituting them into the objective function (4a) gives us the new objective function OI as given in
equation (6). Simplifying constraint (4e) gives us the constraint rH  rL or rH AL. 
Lemma A.1. In the NSC model with observable design license:
 when  2
h
2
1+
;1

, the inclusive strategy is dominated by the high-type-only strategy;
 when  2

1=2; 2
1+

, the technology supplier's optimal inclusive strategy is interior low-royalty separat-
ing;
 when  2

0;min
n
1=2; 2
1+
oi
, the technology supplier's optimal inclusive strategy changes from interior
high-royalty separating, to boundary high-royalty separating, and nally pooling as  increases.
The optimal royalties are:
 rOSL = (1 2)AL+AH3(1 ) , and rOSH = AH3 in both interior high-royalty and low-royalty separating strategies;
 rOBH =AL and rOBL = rOSL in the boundary high-royalty separating strategy;
 rOPH = rOPL = AL+2(AH AL)3 in the pooling strategy.
Proof of Lemma A.1. We maximize over rL and rH in the two feasible regions to maximize the technology
supplier's expected prot OI : First, we analyze the optimal rL and rH of the unconstrained problem and
then check whether the resulting optimal solution falls in the feasible regions. Taking the rst and the second
order derivatives of OI as given in (6) with respect to rL and rH ;
We can verify that OI is jointly concave in both rL and rH : And solving the rst-order conditions, we
have rOSL and r
OS
H as given in Lemma A.1. Substituting them back we have
OST =
 A2H+2AHAL(2  1)+A2L ( 42+7  4)
48(  1) (A.1)
We then study when (rOSL ; r
OS
H ) fall in the feasible regions.
First, rOSH =AH=3<AH .
Second, rOSL AL if and only if   2ALAH+AL . Therefore, when  
2AL
AH+AL
, rOSL AL, the optimal inclusive
strategy requires rL =AL, in which case the low-type's selling quantity is zero and the technology supplier
gets zero prot from the low type. In this case, the inclusive strategy is dominated by the high-type-only
strategy.
Third, rOSH  rOSL if and only if   12 .
Forth, rOSH AL if and only if   1=3.
To summarize, there are two thresholds for  and one threshold for . We can further verify that 2AL
AH+AL
 1
2
if and only if   1=3. So there are six possible cases based on the parameters:
Case 1:   1=3 Case 2:  > 1=3
Case 1.1:  < 2AL
AH+AL
Case 2.1:   1
2
Case 1.2: 2AL
AH+AL
  < 1
2
Case 2.2: 1
2
< < 2AL
AH+AL
Case 1.3:   1
2
Case 2.3:   2AL
AH+AL
Next, we analyze all six possible cases. In cases 1.2, 1.3, and 2.3,   2AL
AH+AL
and thus the inclusive strategy
is dominated by the high-type-only strategy. In case 1.1, rOSH > AL and r
OS
L < AL, so frOSL ; rOSH g falls in
region I and is the optimal solution. In case 2.2, rOSH < r
OS
L and r
OS
L < AL, so frOSL ; rOSH g falls in feasible
region (low-royalty separating) and is the optimal solution. Case 2.1 needs further investigation.
In case 2.1, the rst-order solution (rOSL ; r
OS
H ) falls in the infeasible region. Since 
OI is jointly concave in
rL and rH ; the global optimal (rL; rH) fall on either the boundary high-royalty separating or pooling.
If the boundary high-royalty separating is used, then rH =AL, and rL = r
OS
L : Substituting the two expres-
sions into the technology supplier's and manufacturing rm's expected prots, we derive the technology
supplier's optimal prot as
OBT =
1
48(1 )
 
2A2H +2 (4  5)AHAL+
 
4  16+132A2L (A.2)
and the manufacturing rm's expected prot as
OBM =

8
(AH  AL)2+ (AL ( 2+)+AH)
2
72 (1 )  FM : (A.3)
If the pooling strategy is used, we have rL = rH = r. Substituting it in 
OI ; and taking the derivative of
OI with respect to r; and solving the rst-order condition @
OI
@r
= 0 leads to
rOPH =
AL+2 (AH  AL)
3
AL; (A.4)
Because AL  AH3 and   12 in case 2.1, we can verify that (AL+2 (AH  AL))=3AL. So it is optimal in
the pooling strategy. And the corresponding optimal pooling prot for the technology supplier is
OPT =
1
12
 
2A2H +
 
1 +2A2L+ (1  2)AHAL (A.5)
and the expected prot for the manufacturing rm is
OPM =
1
72
 
 (9  8)A2H +
 
4+5  82A2L+2 ( 7+8)AHAL FM : (A.6)
We compare the technology supplier's prot under the boundary high-royalty separating strategy OBT
with that under the pooling strategy OPT and nd the conditions under which each strategy is optimal.
Summarizing the conditions and the results follow. 
Proof of Proposition 1. The optimal high-type-only strategy is presented in the following Lemma.
Lemma A.2. In the NSC model with observable design license, the technology supplier's optimal high-type-
only license strategy is (rOHH =AH=3;F
OH
H =A
2
H=36), and the corresponding prot is 
OH
T = 5A
2
H=36.
Proof of Lemma A.2. It is optimal to set the constraint binding, i.e., OH(rH ; FH) = (AH   rH)2 =16  
FH = 0: Then substituting FH = (AH   rH)2 =16 into the objective function, we have qOH(rH)rH + FH =


rH (AH   rH)=4+ (AH   rH)2 =16

; which is a concave function. Solving the rst-order condition gives
us rOHH =AH=3. Because r
OH
H <AH , it is the optimal solution. Substituting r
OH
H back gives us F
OH
H and 
OH
T
as presented in the lemma. 
If   2AL
AH+AL
, the optimal strategy for the technology supplier is the high-type-only strategy. If  < 2AL
AH+AL
;
in order to derive the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy, we need to compare its prot under
the high-type-only strategy with that under the inclusive strategy.
Based on the comparison results (the detailed derivations are omitted here but available from the authors
upon request) and the result that the high-type-only strategy is optimal for the technology supplier for
  2AL
AH+AL
; we summarize the technology supplier's optimal strategy for all possible parameter settings and
the results follow.
We also summarize the equilibrium prots as follows. When the technology supplier uses the interior
separating strategy, the pros are
OST =
A2H(6  11)+2AHAL(4+1)+A2L ( 142+29  20)
144(  1) ; (A.7)
OSH =
(AH  AL)(5AH  3AH  AL AL)
48(  1) ; (A.8)
OSSC =
A2H(21  20)+2AHAL(4  5)+A2L ( 112+32  20)
144(  1) : (A.9)
When the technology supplier uses the boundary separating strategy:
OBT =
A2H(13  18)  10AHAL(  2)+A2L ( 232+38  20)
144(  1) ; (A.10)
OBH =
(AH  AL)(5AH  3AH  AL AL)
48(  1) ; (A.11)
OBSC =
A2H(28  27)+ 2AHAL(13  14)+A2L ( 202+41  20)
144(  1) : (A.12)
When the technology supplier uses the pooling strategy:
OPT =
1
72
 
A2H(9  2)+ 4AHAL(  2) A2L
 
22+  10 ; (A.13)
OPH = 
1
48
(AH  AL)(AH(4  3) AL(4+1)); (A.14)
OPSC =
1
144
 
A2H(27  16)+ 2AHAL(16  11)+A2L
  162  5+20 : (A.15)
When the technology supplier uses the high-type-only strategy:
OHT =
5A2H
36
; (A.16)
OHH = 0; (A.17)
OHSC =
5A2H
36
:  (A.18)
Proof of Lemma 2. We rst consider the technology supplier's high-type-only strategy. If the technology
supplier adopts the high-type-only strategy, it oers a license (rH ;FH) to attract the high-type design rm
only. Considering the high-type design rm's optimal quantity, the technology supplier's problem is as follows:
max
frHAH ;FHg

 
rHq
C
H(rH)+FH

s.t. CH(rH ;FH) 0:
By setting the individual rationality constraint binding, we derive FH =
 
AH rH
2
2
. Substituting it into the
objective function and taking the derivative, we get  rH=2< 0: Therefore, the technology supplier's opti-
mal licensing term under the high-type-only strategy: rCHH (xH) = 0, F
CH
H (xH) = x
2
H=4. And the technology
supplier's optimal prot is CHT (xH)x
2
H=4.
We now consider the technology supplier's mechanism design problem under the inclusive strategy.
Similar to the analysis in the NSC model with observable design license, the technology supplier's licensing
fees are
FL =

xL  rL
2
2
; (A.19)
FH =

xH   rH
2
2
 

xH   rL
2
2
+

xL  rL
2
2
: (A.20)
And its mechanism design problem can be simplied as
max
frHxH ;rLxLg
CST (rH ; rL) (A.21a)
s.t. rH  rL or rH  xL; (A.21b)
where
CIT (rH ; rL) = rHq
C
H(rH)+ (1 ) rLqCL (rL)+
(xH   rH)2
4
  (xH   rL)
2
4
+
(xL  rL)2
4
: (A.22)
Taking derivatives of CST (rH ; rL), we have
@CST
@rH
=  rH=2 < 0; @
CS
T
@rL
= ( (xH  xL)  (1 ) rL) ; and
CST is jointly concave in rL and rH : Solving the rst-order conditions we have r

H = 0 and r

L =
(xH xL)
1  :
By the concavity of CST in rL and rH ; considering the optimal (rL; rH) must fall into the feasible regions,
the optimal solution of the inclusive strategy is rCSH (xL; xH) = 0 and r
CS
L (xL; xH) =minfrL; xLg :
If (xH xL)
1   xL; which is equivalent to   xL=xH ; then rCSL (xL; xH) = xL and hence qL = 0: This means
that if   xL=xH ; the low-type design rm does not actually sell products, and the technology supplier gets
zero prot from the low-type. Therefore, the inclusive strategy is dominated by the high-type-only strategy.
If  < xL=xH ,
(xH xL)
1  <xL, then
rCSL (xL; xH) = r

L =
 (xH  xL)
1  < xL; (A.23)
rCSH (xL; xH) = 0: (A.24)
Substituting rCSL (xL; xH) and r
CS
H (xL; xH) into equations (A.19) and (A.20) gives us F
CS
L (xL; xH) and
FCSL (xL; xH) as follows:
FCSH (xL; xH) =
2x2H   4xHxL+(1+)x2L
4  4 ; (A.25)
FCSL (xL; xH) =
(xL xH)2
4 (1 )2 : (A.26)
Finally, we compare the technology supplier's prot in both the high-type-only strategy and the inclusive
strategy. Because the inclusive strategy is dominated by the high-type-only strategy if   xL=xH , we only
need to compare the technology supplier's prots in the two strategies for  < xL=xH : If  < xL=xH ;
CST (xL; xH) CHT (xH) =
x2H
4 (1 )
 
2 +1 (xL=xH)2  22(xL=xH)+ 22   x2H
4 (1 )
:
Denote x = xL=xH . Then it is clear that 
 is convex in x. 
jx=1 > 0; 
jx= = (1 )3 < 0; So there
exist
() =
2+(1 )p(1 )
1 +2 ; (A.27)
such that ()2 (;1), and CST (xL; xH)CHT (xH) if and only if x = xL=xH 2 [();1). 
Proof of Proposition 2. We rst show that there does not exist an equilibrium where xH  xL. We prove
by contradictions.
First, we consider the case where xH < xL. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium such that xH < xL.
Then from the technology supplier's point of view, the low-type now has a higher eective demand. If it only
aims at attracting the low-type design rm, it oers a single contract with zero royalty, that is, rL = 0. Then
the manufacturing rm's optimal response is wL =AL=2 by equation (8). Because the manufacturing rm
has the belief that the technology supplier oers only one contract, if a high-type design rm indeed asks the
manufacturing rm for a quotation, the manufacturing rm believes that the design rm takes rL = 0 and will
oer a wholesale price wH =AH=2 by equation (8). Then xH =AH  wH =AH=2> xL =AL  wL =AL=2,
which contradicts with xH < xL. If the technology supplier uses a separating strategy, then reversing L
and H, and replacing  with 1   , we have rL = 0 and rH = (1   )(AL   wL   AH + wH)=. Solving
these two equations together with equation (8), we have the equilibrium outcome as wL =AL=2 and wH =
(2AH AL+AL)=(2+2). Then xH =AH wH = (AL+2AH AL)=(2+2), and xL =AL wL =AL=2.
Then xH xL = (AL+2AH AL AL AL)=(2+2) = (AH AL)=(1+)> 0; which contradicts with
xH <xL.
We now consider the case where xH = xL, In an equilibrium where xH = xL, the two types of design rms
are eectively the same from the technology supplier's point of view. So the technology supplier's do not need
to solve a mechanism design problem. Instead, its optimal decision is to set the royalty as zero to maximize
the eciency and use the licensing fee to extract all the prots generated by the design rm. Therefore, it
must be that rL = rH = 0, and FL = FH = (AH  wH)2=4. Then given rL = rH = 0, the manufacturing rm's
optimal wholesale prices are wH = AH=2 and wL = AL=2 by equation (8). Then xH = AH   wH = AH=2,
xL =AL wL =AL=2, and thus xH >xL, which contradicts with xH = xL.
If xH >xL in equilibirum, rH = 0 by Lemma 2. Then the manufacturing rm's optimal wholesale price for
the high-type is wH =AH=2 by equation (8).
If the technology supplier uses a high-type-only strategy, then FH = (xH)
2=4 = (AH  wH)2=4 = A2H=16.
For the manufacturing rm's decision on wL, given that the technology supplier oers a single contract with
zero royalty and licensing fee equals to A2H=16, suppose a low-type design rm did take the contract then
ask the manufacturing rm for a quotation, the manufacturing rm's optimal response is wL = AL=2 by
equation (8). Then from the technology supplier's point of view, xi = Ai=2, i 2 fL;Hg. Using the result
in Lemma 2, the high-type-only strategy is indeed optimal if and only   (xL=xH). Therefore, rCHH = 0,
FCHH = (AH)
2=16, and wCHH = AH=2, w
CH
L = AL=2 is an equilibrium if and only   (xL=xH), which is
equivalent to   () = (2+(1 )p(1 ))=(1 +2).
If the technology supplier uses an inclusive strategy, then rL = (AH wH AL+wL)=(1 ), and rH = 0
by Lemma 2. Solving these two equations with equation (8) for i2 fL;Hg we have, rCSL = (AH AL)=(2 ),
rCSH = 0, w
CS
L = (2AL AH)=(4 2), and wCSH =AH=2. Substituting xi with Ai wi, i=L;H in equations
(A.26) and (A.25), we have FCSL = (AH   2AL)2=(8  4)2 and FCSH = ((8  7)A2H   12(1  )AHAL+
4(1   2)A2L)=(8   4)2. In addition, xH   xL = (AH   AL)(1   )=(2   ) > 0. And wL  0 if and only
2AL AH  0.
For this to be an equilibrium, we also need to make sure that the inclusive strategy is the technology
supplier's optimal strategy given wL and wH . By Lemma 2, the inclusive strategy is optimal if and only if
  (xL=xH), which simplies to
AH   2AL+2AL
4  2 
AH

2+(1 )p(1 )
2((  1)+1) : (A.28)
Simplifying 2AL   AH  0 and condition (A.28) together, we have   () = ((2   1) + (2  
)
p
(1 ))=(2(1 +2)).
Comparing () with (): ()  () = (1 
p
(1 ))
2(1 +2) > 0: Then the results on existence of equilibria
follow.
We next compare the two equilibria. Plugging the equilibrium outcomes into the prot functions, we get
prots as follows:
In the equilibrium where the technology supplier uses the high-type-only strategy, the technology supplier's
prot (not including the licensing fee in the manufacturing license) is
CHT = A
2
H=16; (A.29)
and the manufacturing rm's gross prot (not considering the licensing fee in the manufacturing license) is
CHM = A
2
H=8: (A.30)
In the equilibrium where the technology supplier uses the separating strategy:
CST =
A2H
2(5  4)+ 4AHAL (22  3+1)  4A2L (3  22+2  1)
16(  2)2 ; (A.31)
CSM =
A2H(4  3)+ 4AHAL(  1)  4A2L(  1)
8(  2)2 : (A.32)
Comparing the prots in both equilibria when ()  < () and the result follow. 
Proof of Proposition 3. If the design license is observable to the manufacturing rm, the technology
supplier's optimal strategies and the associated prots for the technology supplier and the design rm are
summarized in Proposition 1 and its proof.
If the design license is condential, the prots are as follows: When  < (), the technology supplier's
prot is CHT = 3A
2
H=16.
When   3() = (), the technology supplier's prot is
CST =
4A2L(1 )+A2H(4  3)  4AHAL(1 )
8(2 )2 : (A.33)
Comparing the prots in both scenarios and the results follow. 
Proof of Proposition 4. We prove the proposition by contradiction. Suppose the technology supplier vio-
lates the condentiality clause in the manufacturing contract. Then the design license can be revealed to the
manufacturer by either the technology supplier itself or by the design rm.
First, suppose it is the technology supplier itself who reveals the design license to the manufacturer. It
would do so because it can get additional prot OT  CT ; but it also means a breach penalty at least OT  CT .
This implies the technology supplier would be worse o violating the condentiality agreements.
Second, suppose it is the design rm who reveals the design license to the manufacturer. The design rm
would do so only if there is no condentiality clause in the design license that forbids such behavior. Then
the technology supplier would incur a penalty at least OT  CT , which is larger than the maximum gain that
it can get. This implies the technology supplier would be worse o not imposing the condentiality clause
in the design license. However, being the sole supplier of the technology, the technology supplier is able to
impose a condentiality clause in the design license to prevent the design rm from revealing the design
license to the manufacturer.
In summary, given the provisions specied in the proposition, it is incentive compatible for the technology
supplier to keep the design license condential, and to impose a condentiality clause in the design license
to prevent the design rm from revealing. Therefore, the technology suppliers commitment is credible. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 2 after replacing xi, i2 fL;Hg with Ai, i2
fL;Hg. In addition, we can show that   () if and only if   (), where () = 1+2 (1 )
p
(1 )(1+3)
4 4+22 .
The technology supplier's prot, total supply chain prot, consumer surplus, and social welfare are as follows.
In the integrated model, when the technology supplier uses the separating strategy, the prots are
IST =
 2AL(AH2)+A2H2+A2L(2 +1)
4(1 ) ; (A.34)
ISH =
(AH  AL)(3AH AH  AL AL)
4(  1) ; (A.35)
ISSC =
A2H(2  1)  2AHAL2+A2L(2  1)
4(  1) : (A.36)
When the technology supplier uses the high-type-only strategy, we have
IHT =
A2H
4
; (A.37)
IHH = 0; (A.38)
IHSC =
A2H
4
:  (A.39)
Proof of Proposition 6. For the technology supplier's prot, comparing it under both supply chain models
in dierent conditions and the results follow.
For the downstream prot, because the low-type downstream rm always gets zero prot in both supply
chain models, and the manufacturing rm's prot is always zero in the NSC model, comparing the total
downstream prot is the same as comparing the high-type downstream rm's prot.
The high-type downstream rm's equilibrium prot in all dierent cases as shown in equations (A.38),
(A.35), (A.8), (A.11), (A.14), and (A.17). Comparing the high-type downstream rm's prot in both supply
chain models under dierent conditions, and the result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 7. In the integrated model, the technology supplier's optimal strategies and the
associated prots for the technology supplier and the IDM rm are summarized in Proposition 5 and its
proof. In the NSC model, if the design license is condential, the prots for the technology supplier and the
design rm are summarized in the proof of Proposition 3.
 When  2 0;  (), the technology supplier uses the high-type-only strategy in both supply chain
models. In this region, the downstream prot is always zero in both supply chain models. Comparing the
technology supplier's prots in both supply chain models, we have that the technology supplier's prot is
always lower in the NSC model. And the total supply chain prot is always lower in the NSC model.
 When  2  () ;  (), the technology supplier uses the high-type-only strategy in the integrated model,
but uses the inclusive strategy in the NSC model. In the integrated model, the downstream prot is zero
because the technology supplier uses the high-type-only strategy. But the downstream prot is positive in
the NSC model because the high type design rm gets a positive information rent. Comparing the technology
supplier's prot we have that the technology supplier's prot is higher in the NSC model if and only if
8  152+83+(4+42  83)+( 12+16  82+43)2  0; (A.40)
which is equivalent to
   2
3+2  (  2)p ( 43+112  13+6)+
2 (3  22+4  3) :
Dene
1() =max
(
  2
3+2  (  2)p ( 43+112  13+6)+
2 (3  22+4  3) ;  ()
)
:
We can verify that there exists a constant b0 2 [0;1] such that 1() () if and only if   b0. Then in
this region, the technology supplier's prot is higher in the NSC model if and only if 1()    ().
Comparing the total supply chain prot we have that the NSC model leads to a higher total supply chain
prot if and only if
f(b) = 4b3y  12y2+ b2( 3  8y  8y2)+ b(4+ 4y+20y2) 0:
Then limb!0 = 122 < 0 and limb!1 = 1> 0. In addition, we can show that f 0(b)> 0 when  2

 () ;  ()

.
Therefore, there exist a 3() such that f(b) 0 (the NSC model leads to a higher total supply chain prot)
if and only if   3().
 When  2 [ () ;1], the technology supplier uses the inclusive strategy in both supply chain models.
Comparing the prots we have that the downstream prot and the total supply chain prot are lower in the
NSC model, and the technology supplier's prot is higher in the NSC model if and only if
 8+252  133+(4  322+203)+(4  4+122  83)2  0: (A.41)
We can show that when   (), condition (A.41) is equivalent to   b0 and
  2() 5
3  82+(  2)p  (3  52+6  2)+
2 (23  32+  1) :
Then in this region, the technology supplier's prot is higher in the NSC model if and only if  ()  
2 ().
Summarizing all cases and the results follow. 
Proof of Proposition 8. First, we can verify that when  < b0 and 1()< < 2(), if the design license
is observable to the manufacturing rm, then the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy can be
interior high royalty separating, boundary high royalty separating, or pooling. The technology supplier is
willing to keep the design license condential, as shown in Proposition 3.
We need to make sure that the design rm also gets more prots by keeping the design license condential.
When  < b0 and 1() <  < 2(), it can be shown that if the technology supplier's optimal licensing
strategy under observable design license is either interior high royalty separating or boundary high royalty
separating, the high-type design rm's prot is always higher under condential design license; whereas if
the technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy under observable design license is pooling, the high-type
design rm's prot is higher under condential design license if
 ((4(  1)  3  5)+12+8) 8: (A.42)
Given   1=2, which is a condition for pooling to be optimal under observable design licence, equation
(A.42) holds if
   (4
2+5  8)
43  32+12  8 : (A.43)
Combining the above condition with those in Proposition 7, the results follow. 
Proposition A.1. Suppose the design license is determined ahead of the manufacturing license and
observable to the manufacturer. The technology supplier's optimal licensing strategy is as follows:
  1=2  
p
=(3  2) : High-type-only strategy
 p=(3  2) : Pooling strategy
  1=2
  +2
p
(1 )3
4 5+22 : High-type-only strategy
+2
p
(1 )3
4 5+22     : Separating strategy
   : Pooling strategy
The optimal royalties are:
 rH = 0 in the high-type-only strategy;
 rH = 0 and rL = AH AL1  in the separating strategy;
 rH = rL = 0 in the pooling strategy.
Proof of Proposition A.1. We rst derive the technology supplier's optimal high-type-only strategy, then
its optimal inclusive strategy, and nally compare the two to derive its eventual optimal strategy.
Under the high-type-only strategy, the technology supplier chooses (rH ;FH) to maximize
max
 
qH (rH) rH +FH +F
H
M

s.t. H (rH ; FH) 0 and rH AH
Setting the constraint H (rH ; FH) 0 binding, we have H (rH ; FH) = (AH   rH)2 =16 FH = 0; i.e., FH =
(AH   rH)2 =16: Substituting qH (rH) ; FH ; and FHM into the objective function, we can rewrite the problem
as
maxHT = 

rH (AH   rH)=4+ (AH   rH)2 =16+ (AH   rH)2 =8

s.t. rH AH
Since @HT =@rH < 0; it is optimal to set rH = 0: Then FH =A
2
H=16, F
H
M =A
2
H=8; and 
H
T = 3A
2
H=16:
Under the inclusive strategy, the technology supplier's problem can be formulated as follows
maxIT = 
 
rHqH (rH)+FH +F
H
M

+(1 )  rLqL (rL)+FL+FLM
= 

rH (AH   rH)=4+FH +(AH   rH)2 =8

+
(1 )

rL (AL  rL)=4+FL+(AL  rL)2 =8

s.t. IRH : H(rH ;FH) 0 and rH AH ;
IRL : L(rL; FL) 0 and rL AL;
ICH : H(rH ;FH) H(rL; FL);
ICL : L(rL; FL) L(rH ; FH) or rH AL:
By similar analysis as in the paper, the IRL and ICH constraints are binding, then we have FL =
(AL  rL)2 =16 and FH =

(AH   rH)2  (AH   rL)2

=16+ (AL  rL)2 =16:
For the ICL constraint L(rL;FL) L(rH ;FH); after substituting FL and FH into this inequality, we can
obtain rL  rH :
To summarize, under inclusive strategy, the technology supplier's problem can be rewritten as
max
rH ;rL
IT = (rH (AH   rH)=4+

(AH   rH)2  (AH   rL)2

=16+ (AL  rL)2 =16+ (AH   rH)2 =8)
+(1 ) (rL (AL  rL)=4+ (AL  rL)2 =16+ (AL  rL)2 =8)
s.t. rL  AL;
rH  rL or rH AL:
Since @HT =@rH =  (AH + rH)=8< 0; rH = 0: Since @HT =@rL = (AH  AL  (1 ) rL)=8; the optimal
value for rL needs to be discussed.
(i) If AH  AL (i.e., AL=AH  ), then rL = 0 which results in pooling strategy. In this case, IT =
(A2L (3  2)+ 2A2H)=16; L = 0; H =A2H=16 A2L=16; FHM =A2H=8; and FLM =A2L=8:
(ii) If AH AL (i.e., AL=AH  ), rL =minfAH AL1  ;ALg:
(ii.a) When AL=AH  = (2 ) ; then AH AL1   AL; and rL = AL: In this case, qL (rL) = 0: Therefore,
this case is dominated by the high-type-only strategy.
(ii.b) When AL=AH >= (2 ) ; rL = AH AL1  : Then
IT = ((4  5+22)A2L+ (2 )A2H   2AHAL)= (16 (1 )) ; L = 0; H = (AH   rL)2 =16  
(AL  rL)2 =16; FHM =A2H=8; and FLM = (AL  rL)2 =8; where rL = AH AL1  :
Next, compare the technology supplier's prot under the high-type-only strategy and under the inclusive
strategy to derive its optimal strategy.
(1) If AL=AH   (i.e., AH AL), IT  HT = (A2L (3  2) A2H)=16:
(1.a) If AL=AH 
p
= (3  2); IT  HT : That is, inclusive strategy is optimal for the technology supplier,
and rH = r

L = 0:
(1.b) If AL=AH 
p
= (3  2); IT  HT : That is, high-type-only strategy is optimal for the technology
supplier, and rH = 0; FH =A
2
H=16:
(2) If AL=AH   (i.e., AH AL)
(2.a) If AL=AH  = (2 ) ; by (ii.a) the optimal strategy is high-type-only strategy.
(2.b) IfAL=AH  = (2 ) ; IT HT =

(4  5+22) (AL=AH)2  2AL=AH  +22

A2H= (16 (1 ))

A2H= (16 (1 )) : We can show that 
 is convex in : 
jAL=AH= =  (1 )2 (2  1) and

jAL=AH==(2 ) = 4 (  1)3 = (  2)2 < 0:
(2.b1) If   1=2; IT  HT always.
(2.b2) If  > 1=2; there exists a threshold of AL=AH ; which equals
+2
p
(1 )3
4 5+22 , such that 
I
T  HT for
AL=AH 2 [= (2 ) ; +2
p
(1 )3
4 5+22 ]; and 
I
T  HT for AL=AH 2 [+2
p
(1 )3
4 5+22 ; ]; where r

H = 0; r

L =
AH AL
1  :
In the following, we summarize the technology supplier's optimal strategy by combining the results above.
First, we note the following equivalences:
  1=2 ()  
p
= (3  2)
  1=2 ()  
+2
q
 (1 )3
4  5+22
Case 1:   1=2: This implies  p= (3  2) and   +2p(1 )3
4 5+22 :
Case 1.1: If AL=AH  ; by (2.b1), IT  HT : Thus, high-type-only strategy is optimal.
Case 1.2: If  AL=AH 
p
= (3  2); by (1.b) IT  HT : Thus, high-type-only strategy is optimal.
Case 1.3: If AL=AH 
p
= (3  2); by (1.a) IT  HT : Thus, inclusive strategy is optimal, and rH = rL = 0;
which is pooling strategy:
Case 2:   1=2: This implies  p= (3  2) +2p(1 )3
4 5+22  = (2 ) :
Case 2.1: If AL=AH  = (2 ) ; by (2.a) the optimal strategy is high-type-only strategy.
Case 2.2: If = (2 )  AL=AH  +2
p
(1 )3
4 5+22 ; by (2.b2) 
I
T  HT and hence the optimal strategy is
high-type-only strategy.
Case 2.3: If
+2
p
(1 )3
4 5+22 AL=AH  ; by (2.b2) IT  HT : Thus, the separating strategy with rH = 0 and
rL =
AH AL
1  is optimal.
Case 2.4: If AL=AH  ; by (1.a) inclusive strategy is optimal, and rH = rL = 0; which is pooling strategy.

Proof of the Nonnegative Licensing Fee Extension In the presence of the nonnegative licensing fee con-
straint, the problem to derive the optimal inclusive strategy under the NSC model with observ-
able design license is written in the extension section 6.3. Note that the IRL and ICH con-
straints lead to (AL  rL)2 =16  FL  (AH   rL)2 =16   (AH   rH)2 =16 + FH : Therefore, FH 
(AL  rL)2 =16   (AH   rL)2 =16 + (AH   rH)2 =16: If the ICL constraint is satised by rH  AL;
then (AH   rH)2 =16  (AH  AL)2 =16 and FH  (AL  rL)2 =16   (AH   rL)2 =16 + (AH  AL)2 =16 =
(AL AH) (AL+AH   2rL)=16 + (AH  AL)2 =16 = (AL AH) (AL + AH   2rL + AL   AH)=16 =
(AL AH) (2AL  2rL) 0: This, together with the constraint of FH  0; leads to FH = 0. As a result, the
IRL and ICH constraints lead to (AL  rL)2 =16  FL  (AH   rL)2 =16  (AH   rH)2 =16: By rH  AL; we
have (AL  rL)2 =16  FL  (AH   rL)2 =16  (AH  AL)2 =16 = (AL  rL) (2AH   rL AL)=16: If AL > rL;
then (AL  rL)=16 (2AH   rL AL)=16; which is equivalent to AL AH ; contradicting the assumption of
AL <AH : Therefore, it is only possible that AL = rL: By the IRL constraint and FL  0; we have FL = 0:
By the ICH constraint and rH AL; we have rH =AL:
To summarize, if the ICL constraint is satised by rH AL; then we have rH = rL =AL; and FL = FH = 0:
In this case, the low-type design rm's selling quantity is zero and the technology supplier gets zero prot
from the low type. Then the inclusive strategy is dominated by the high-type-only strategy. Therefore, the
ICL constraint satised by rH AL can never be optimal for the technology supplier.
The other way to satisfy the ICL constraint is through oL (rL;FL) oL (rH ;FH) : Standard analysis tells
that the IRL and ICH constraints are binding. That is, FL = (AL  rL)2 =16 and FH = (AH   rH)2 =16 
(AH   rL)2 =16 + FL: Then oL (rL; FL)  oL (rH ;FH) leads to rH  rL: Under these conditions, FH ; FL  0
are satised. Substituting the expressions of FH and FL into the objective function, we derive the objective
function as a jointly concave function in rH and rL: First order condition leads to the same r
OS
L and r
OS
H as in
Lemma A.1. In the proof of Lemma A.1., there are 6 cases. By adding the constraint of FH ;FL  0; only Case
1.1 and Case 2.1 need to be re-analyzed. In Case 1.1, rOSL <AL; but r
OS
H =AH=3>AL > r
OS
L ; which violates
the constraint of rH  rL: By the joint concavity of the objective function in rH ; rL; optimally, (rH ; rL) should
move to the pooling boundary. Therefore, in Case 1.1, pooling strategy is the optimal inclusive strategy.
Similarly, in Case 2.1, the rst-order solution (rOSH ; r
OS
L ) falls in the infeasible region. Again, by the joint
concavity of the objective function in rH ; rL; (rH ; rL) should move to the pooling boundary in the optimal
inclusive strategy. Therefore, pooling is the optimal inclusive strategy for both Case 1.1 and Case 2.1, which
correspond to Regions 2,4,5 in Figure 3(a). By comparing the technology supplier's prot under the pooling
strategy with that under the high-type-only strategy, we can derive its nal optimal strategy. As a clear
illustration, the technology supplier's optimal strategy under the NSC model with observable design license
and nonnegative licensing fee is summarized in Figure 8, with the solid lines separating the three regions of
optimal policy: High type only, interior low-royalty separating, and pooling. For the downstream rm's prot
comparison between the integrated model and the NSC model with observable design license and constraint
of FH ;FL  0; we have the following prot expressions.
Under the NSC model with observable design license and nonnegative licensing fee:
When low-royalty separating strategy is used,
OSH =
(AH  AL) (5AH  3AH  AL AL)
48 (  1) :
When pooling strategy is used,
OPH =
(AH  AL) (AL (4+1) AH (4  3))
48
:
When high-type-only strategy is used,
OHH = 0:
Under the integrated model:
When separating strategy is used,
ISH =
(AH  AL) (3AH AH  AL AL)
4 (  1) :
When high-type-only strategy is used,
IHH = 0:
The comparison results are summarized in the extension section. 
